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STEPHEN PRESSER’S LOVE LETTER TO
THE LAW, IN FIVE PARTS
LAW PROFESSORS: THREE CENTURIES OF
SHAPING AMERICAN LAW. By Stephen B. Presser.1 St.
Paul: West Publishing, 2017. Pp. xii + 486. $48.00 (cloth).
Jesse Merriam2
This book on law professors, Stephen Presser writes in the
Preface, is a “love letter to the teaching of law” (p. v). But this is
no mere “love letter.” The twenty-four chapters read more like a
break-up letter, sounding with each successive chapter the
ominous tone of a betrayed lover—more like Søren Kierkegaard’s
regretful reflections on losing Regine Olsen to a more decisive
suitor, and less like Kierkegaard’s earlier romantic confessions of
adoration for Regine.3 Reading Law Professors, one gets the
impression that, like Kierkegaard, Presser is writing his love letter
with some bitterness, recalling the halcyon days of the legal
academy when it was more insulated from the mass and welter of
partisan politics.
Like all love letters contemplating the future of the
relationship, Law Professors is essentially about change and loss,
1. Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History Emeritus, Northwestern University
School of Law.
2. Assistant Professor, Political Science, Loyola University Maryland. Ph.D.
(Political Science, Johns Hopkins University); J.D. (The George Washington University
School of Law); M.A. (Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University); B.A. (Wesleyan
University).
3. For Kierkegaard’s letters to Regine, see SØREN KIERKEGAARD, PAPERS AND
JOURNALS: A SELECTION (Alastair Hannay ed., 1996). For an excellent review of a recent
Danish book specifically on the relationship between Kierkegaard and Olsen, see Morten
Høi Jensen, A Keeper of Love’s Flame: Regine Olsen and Søren Kierkegaard, L.A. REV.
BOOKS (Apr. 9, 2014), http://lareviewofbooks.org/article/keeper-loves-flame-regineolsen-soren-kierkegaard. This is a review OF JOAKIM GARFF, REGINES GÅDE: HISTORIEN
OM KIERKEGAARDS FORLOVEDE OG SCHLEGELS HUSTRU (2013), which translates to
“Regine’s Mystery: The Story of Kierkegaard’s Fiancée and Schlegel’s Wife.” Garff’s book
sounds fascinating, and I would also recommend it in addition to Jensen’s excellent review,
but, alas, I do not read Danish.

71

5 - MERRIAM .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/25/18 11:59 AM

72

[Vol. 33:71

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

making it ideal for a course on social movements and legal
change.4 These themes are all the more serious, given Presser’s
prominent academic status, holding joint appointments at
Northwestern University5 and having authored several
casebooks—ranging from corporate law, to legal history, to
constitutional law and theory—as well as two important, and
controversial, books arguing for a reconsideration of various
areas of constitutional law.6 Presser’s recent move to emeritus
status gives this tome on law professors an even heavier tone, the
ruminations of a legal giant on his thirty-plus years of experience
in the legal academy.
While Law Professors is a ruminative book, it is also a
thoroughly fun and playful one. Presser, in critiquing the prolixity
and opacity of legal scholarship, quotes Ronald Rotunda’s
observation that “[r]eading about law is not often fun” (p. 7 n.13),
a proposition with which this reviewer generally agrees. But there
are exceptions, times when reading law can be as enjoyable as
reading literature. And Professor Presser has provided such an
exception in this book. Indeed, even knowledgeable readers will
find in Law Professors trivia certain to titillate and amuse. Sure,
you already knew about Posner’s contributions to the law and
economics movement, but did you know about Fang, his
Norwegian elkhound (p. 308)? Or that James Wilson was the
nation’s third law professor (p. 32 n.77)? Presser even divulges
some information about himself, such as that he is a Dr. Seuss fan,
something that might surprise some followers of Presser’s
academic writing over the years (p. 137 n.445). Nearly every one
of the 473 highly digestible pages, including the 1,384 unbroken
sequential footnotes, bubbles with factoids that historically
oriented, and indeed all intellectually curious, readers will enjoy.
The trivia keeps the book light, but the sense of change, and
the resulting loss, creates an acute sense of betrayal, with three
ominous themes reappearing throughout the work. One is the
4. For example, I am considering using it for my seminar on the legal conservative
movement.
5. Presser holds appointments at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, the
Kellogg School of Management, and the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences,
Department of History.
6. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION: RACE,
RELIGION, AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED (1994); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE
ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC
OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
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evolving conception of law over the last 200 years. At various
points in the book, Presser emphasizes how law professors have
moved away from a natural theory of law (wherein legal norms
inhere in the divine order of the world, thus creating a necessary
relationship between law and morality) and toward a more
positivistic understanding (wherein legal norms are ultimately
traceable to positive political action, thereby severing the
necessary connection between law and morality). Presser,
through his careful chronicling of the American legal academy,
documents how Oliver Wendell Holmes represented a dramatic
departure from the natural law tradition, and indeed the entire
American legal tradition. Strikingly, all of the pre-Holmes
professors featured in the book make natural law a central feature
of their understanding of law, and almost all of the post-Holmes
professors reject this approach in favor of a more positivist,
empirical, and court-oriented understanding. Nearly everyone
reading this book will already be aware of this transition away
from legal naturalism and formalism and toward positivism and
realism, but even to the informed reader, it is startling to see in
Presser’s chronology how abruptly and comprehensively
conceptions of law have changed within the legal academy.
A related theme intimated throughout the book is the
increasing politicization of the legal academy, especially toward
the left end of the ideological spectrum. Presser often alludes to
how many of the 18th and 19th century scholars featured in the
book did not make politics a central feature of their scholarship,
in stark contrast with 20th and 21st century legal scholars. Indeed,
the 21st century law professor is no longer expected simply to
have the expertise to analyze and teach law, but to be especially
well equipped to make law, too. This is vividly illustrated in
Presser’s chronology, with many of the post-Holmes scholars
having worked in the executive branch, almost always to push
legal reform for the advancement of a progressive agenda. This
trend is represented most strikingly in Chapter 23, profiling
President Barack Obama, the apotheosis of the progressive
politician-professor.
The 2016 election put this new law professor identity on full
display. Following President Donald Trump’s victory, one
thousand four hundred twenty-four law professors took the
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unprecedented step7 of joining a public statement condemning
Trump’s nomination of Jeff Sessions for attorney general.8 Just a
few months before that, in the month leading up to the election,
many right-of-center law professors joined a statement,
Originalists Against Trump, opposing the Republican nominee.9
At the same time, some significant progressive law professors
publicly called for secession, and even a military coup, in the event
of a Trump victory.10 And in February 2017, yet another law
professor statement was circulated, this one condemning Trump
for calling U.S. District Court Judge James L. Robart a “so-called
judge,” in light of Judge Robart’s decision to enjoin Trump’s first
travel ban Executive Order.11
Such recent public gestures from the legal academy make
Presser’s book particularly timely and provocative. Presser asks
throughout the book: What gives law professors the authority to
evaluate public policy? More troubling, he probes, what gives law
professors the skill to engage in policy, a question suggested by
former CIA Director, Leon Panetta, in his criticism of President
Obama’s tendency to “rel[y] on the logic of a law professor rather
than the passion of a leader” (p. 1). This issue, of what skills a law
professor can bring to governance, and the related transition in
the identity of the law professor, from natural lawyer to policy
maker, are central to Presser’s love letter.
A third theme, hinted at but not as expressly stated as the
previous two, is the changing meaning of legal ideology over space

7. The only other instance in which law professors have been so outspoken on a
presidential election was, perhaps not coincidentally, in response to the 2000 victory of the
last Republican President, George W. Bush. Within days of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), over 600 law school professors wrote a public letter
condemning the decision as violating their commitments “as teachers whose lives have
been dedicated to the rule of law.” See Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive
Bush v. Gore?, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 110, 113 (Bruce
Ackerman ed., 2002).
8. Law Professors in Opposition to Jeff Sessions Nomination (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://docs.google.com/document/d/167Ci3pVqwzOUe7_e7itlpew1qGcTo0ZD5dNICIb
LQWA/pub.
9. 2016
Statement,
Originalists
Against
Trump
(Oct.
17,
2016),
https://originalistsagainsttrump.wordpress.com/2016-statement.
10. Jacob Gershman, Law Professors Grapple with Trump, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 2, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/11/02/law-professors-grapple-withtrump/?ref=/blogs/law.
11. Letter from Attorneys Concerning President Trump’s Attack on the Judiciary
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1JVcPW_mYa5jw6nm_R7XS21l5igpm
BzfBONBFMmrOALs/viewform?c=0&w=1&edit_requested=true#responses.

5 - MERRIAM .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

BOOK REVIEWS

2/25/18 11:59 AM

75

and time. For example, Presser argues that Justice Story was “a
great Burkean, and a great conservative” (p. 60), despite the fact
that Story favored a robust and expansive judicial power, which
of course is at odds with how many contemporary conservatives
view the role of federal judges. For Presser—who is “nothing if
not a traditionalist” (p. ix), what is often referred to in
conservative thought as “a paleoconservative”12—the traditional
meaning of legal conservatism favors “a moral, altruistic Burkean
legal aristocracy” (p. 60), one in which courts are actively engaged
in preserving the nation’s social mores and traditions for the
stability and moral health of society. This is a view increasingly at
odds with both the contemporary legal left (which generally
favors judicial transformation of these values to promote greater
equality) and legal right (which generally favors judicial
disengagement from these values to promote democratic
governance and decentralization).13
As Mark Pulliam, a prolific conservative legal writer,
explained in a recent review of Law Professors, “Presser may be
the most conservative law professor in America associated with a
major law school.”14 Although I am not quite as comfortable
ideologically ranking professors, as that begs the question of what
it means to be more or less conservative (a question on which
many reasonable minds can and will disagree, especially as
applied to legal issues), it is undoubtedly true that Presser is one
12. Paleoconservatives (“paleocons”) generally are defined in contradistinction to a
new (and decidedly more liberal) form of conservatism that emerged in the 1970s, a group
now known as neoconservatives (“neocons”). Paleocons and neocons generally divide
most sharply with regard to their ideological preferences on three issues: (1) the size of the
federal government (neocons are much more accommodating of the welfare state), (2) the
use of American military force abroad (neocons are much more likely to support
interventionist policies), and (3) the role of egalitarian perspectives in conservatism
(neocons view egalitarianism as central to, rather than antithetical to, conservatism). See
Paul Gottfried, Paleoconservativism, in AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
651 (Bruce Frohnen et al. eds., 2006).
13. But it should be noted that, among right-of-center law professors, there is an
increasing push for more judicial engagement and less judicial restraint. This comes almost
exclusively, however, from the libertarian strand, rather than the more traditionalist
strand, of legal conservatism. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016);
Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 845 (2012); SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE
ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–1787 (2011).
14. Mark Pulliam, American Legal Thought in a Nutshell, LAW &
LIBERTY (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2017/03/16/american-legalthought-in-a-nutshell.
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of the few remaining paleoconservatives left in legal academia.15
With Presser’s exit from the academy, this traditional version of
conservatism has virtually no voice in legal scholarship, or in legal
discourse altogether, giving a particularly poignant and literal
meaning to the “paleo” prefix.
In the following pages, I will analyze how the book raises
these three themes: the changing conceptions of law, the changing
identities of law professors, and the changing meaning of legal
ideology. I will do this by dividing the review into five parts, based
on my placing the twenty-four chapters into five distinct
categories. Chapters 1 through 4 constitute the romance of the
love letter, what I have characterized as Falling in Love, the
period when, to use Kierkegaard’s words from one of his love
letters, “a man sees the beloved object for the first time . . . [and]
believes he has seen her long before.”16 This period—which
Presser explores through such diverse thinkers as Blackstone,
Wilson, Story, and Langdell—is characterized by legal naturalism,
when law was imbricated in and tethered to nature. Chapters 5
through 8 cover the Villain, legal realism, which can be
characterized as a period when law was denaturalized and thereby
seduced away from Presser. The third period, Reconciliation,
covers the effort to bring the law back home, through a middleground, process-oriented approach to law, explored most directly
in Chapters 9 and 11. The fourth period, A Second Infidelity,
covers another round of villains, the critical legal scholars, more
radical but perhaps more interesting than the realists, explored in
15. This, incidentally, is at least partly responsible for why Presser felt “lonely being
a Donald Trump supporter in the legal academy,” a position that, as Presser noted, “not
more than a handful of” law professors were willing to take openly. Stephen Presser, What
American Law Professors Forgot and What Trump Knew, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2016),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-law-professors-trumpscalia-supreme-court-conservative-perspec-1118-md-20161117-story.html. In typical Press
erian accuracy, he is not exaggerating or being metaphorical with the term “handful.”
Besides Presser, exactly five law professors in the country were willing to support the
Republican nominee openly: F.H. Buckley, John C. Eastman, Bruce Frohnen, Lino
Graglia, and Ronald Rotunda. See Chris Buskirk, Scholars and Writers for Trump,
AMERICAN GREATNESS (Sept. 28, 2016), http://amgreatness.com/2016/09/28/writesscholars-for-trump. Many of the right-of-center law professors in the nation publicly
opposed Trump. See supra note 9. It should be noted that Trump received significant
support from paleoconservatives, such as Presser, not because Trump represents a
traditional mode of life (he most certainly does not, as a flamboyant, secular, thricemarried, real-estate mogul), but because he supports the three policy platforms that
paleoconservatives tend to care about most: (1) military isolationism, (2) trade
protectionism, and (3) immigration restrictionism. See supra note 12.
16. See KIERKEGAARD, supra note 3, at 100.
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Chapters 14 through 17. Finally, the fifth period, A Rocky Future,
looks ahead, examining the response to this second infidelity
through various figures in the legal conservative movement
(Chapters 18 through 20) and the triumph over legal conservatism
in the Obama presidency (Chapters 22 and 23).
Two caveats before we begin, one about the book and the
other about the following review. One, in reading Law Professors,
the attentive reader will undoubtedly find reason to quibble over
Presser’s choices concerning the profiled scholars, an unavoidable
product of his effort to capture the history of the American legal
academy through a select set of figures. One may reasonably
question, for example, why Presser includes one English law
professor (Blackstone), one fictional one (Lewis Eliot), and one
fictional American law professor (Kingsfield)—not to mention
one president who was never a tenure-track law professor (but
rather a lecturer who never published anything on law other than
a six-page student note)17 and several Supreme Court Justices who
spent only a few years in the academy. As a result, Presser devotes
a lot of space in Law Professors to the ideas and experiences of
people who are not American law professors, which may be a bit
startling given the book’s title and theme. This comes at the cost
of excluding many law professors who would have added to the
narrative. For example, would Breyer, the pragmatist and “active
liberty” proponent, satisfy Presser’s call for law professors, and in
turn judges, to be more grounded in and attentive to practical
realities? Does Bork fit Presser’s call for a more majoritarian
sense of tradition in the academy? How would a discussion of
Barnett’s natural-law libertarianism complicate Presser’s
suppositions about the relationship between natural law and
conservatism? These are questions obscured by Presser’s decision
to focus on select professors rather than general concepts in
seeking to capture the ideological transformation of the legal
academy over the last 200 years.
Two, this review will focus to a significant extent on what
Law Professors can teach us about the role of ideology in legal
discourse, which may suggest to the reader of this review that Law
Professors is a polemical tract. I want to be clear on this point:
Law Professors most certainly is not partisan or tendentious, in
17. Jeffrey Ressner & Ben Smith, Exclusive: Obama’s Lost Law Review Article,
POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.politico.com/story/2008/08/exclusive-obamas-lostlaw-review-article-012705.
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any conceivable way. Rather, Law Professors is thoroughly kind
and temperate in tone, and equitable and balanced in analysis.
Nevertheless, in the course of the 473 pages, there are several
places where Presser does reveal his thinking on various matters
and scholars, more often through implication than explication.
This has the salutary effect of permitting, on the one hand, readers
uninterested in Presser’s political and legal philosophy to gather
a broad array of information about the legal academy without the
sense of being harangued, while offering, on the other hand,
sufficient insight into Presser’s traditionalist perspective for more
ideologically oriented readers. In the review, I will be focusing on
this ideological dimension of the book—partly because of my own
background as a legal theorist who studies social movements in
the law, but also because a mere recitation of the profiled scholars
would be unduly duplicative of Presser’s book.
In sum, although some readers will surely quibble over
Presser’s inclusions and exclusions, and some will find insufficient
or perhaps too much ideology in Law Professors,18 the book works
remarkably well in capturing: (1) how law professors think about
law, (2) how this thinking continues to evolve, perhaps at an
accelerated rate over the last fifty years, and (3) how these recent
changes are arousing concern that the rule of law is in serious
trouble. Law Professors is best read not by fixating on the actual
persons profiled, which will inevitably lead the reader to cavil
over some of the choices, but by focusing on the big ideas, with a
particular attention on how those ideas have migrated and
morphed across space and time.
With these caveats in mind, let us begin with when Presser
“sees the beloved object for the first time.”19

18. For example, Mark Pulliam’s only criticism of the book is that it is an
overwhelmingly “dispassionate overview of American legal thought,” and Pulliam would
prefer for Presser to provide a “comprehensive critique of it.” Pulliam, supra note 14.
Conversely, Dean Chemerinsky’s principal criticism is that Presser’s writing is too
ideological, “especially as to the more contemporary portrayals.” Erwin Chemerinsky, A
Conservative’s View of Law Professors, Cal. Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc’y Newsl., Spring/Summer
2017, at 29, https://www.cschs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/2017-Newsletter-SpringConservatives-View.pdf. Moreover, Chemerinsky finds it “disconcerting . . . that [Presser]
asserts his [conservative] views as self-evident conclusions” and “disquieting that virtually
all of th[e] profiled [professors] are white men.” Id. at 30.
19. See KIERKEGAARD, supra note 3, at 100.
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I. FALLING IN LOVE
If Law Professors is Presser’s love letter to the law, the first
three chapters—dedicated to Sir William Blackstone, James
Wilson, and Joseph Story—form the romance of the story,
outlining why and how Presser fell in love with the subject. In each
of these thinkers, Presser finds a religious commitment to the
foundation of law and an aristocratic commitment to social
hierarchy, cultural tradition, and moral order—a view holding
that there is no order without law, no law without morality, and
no morality without religion. A well-ordered society, therefore,
requires religion, and the healthy state must facilitate rather than
subordinate that relationship.
In defending Blackstone, Wilson, and Story against their
familiar opponents, Presser provides provocative and interesting
connections that even the historically oriented reader might not
have considered. In Chapter 1, for example, Presser defends
Blackstone from the criticisms of Bentham, who waged a life-long
attack on his former teacher for mystifying and deifying the
common law.20 Presser is generally dismissive of Bentham,
characterizing his criticism of Blackstone as shallow and personal,
but Presser is more eager to reconcile Blackstone and Thomas
Jefferson, who lambasted Blackstone for being a conservative
Tory. Here, Presser points out that Jefferson’s own legal
philosophy, which of course was characteristic of the
Enlightenment view of law, was strikingly similar to that of
Blackstone, in that while Jefferson resisted explicitly linking law
with a Christian conception of God,21 Jefferson was just as eager
as Blackstone to ground law in the edicts of nature. This is
expressed most famously in the Declaration of Independence,
which Presser draws our attention to, given its close relationship

20. In 1763, when only fifteen years old, Bentham began attending Blackstone’s
Oxford lectures (the lectures from which Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England later emerged). A little more than a decade later, Bentham provided his first
formal critique of Blackstone’s Commentaries. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT (Ross Harrison ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1776). At the age
of 80, more than 50 years after publishing that criticism, Bentham wrote a more sustained
criticism of Blackstone in his A Familiar View of Blackstone, a work that he was editing
until his death, four years later. See J. H. Burns, Bentham and Blackstone: A Lifetime’s
Dialectic, 1 UTILITAS 22 (1989).
21. It should be noted that Jefferson, though skeptical of Jesus’s divinity, clearly
recognized his great philosophical and moral authority. See generally THOMAS JEFFERSON,
JEFFERSON’S EXTRACTS FROM THE GOSPELS (Dickson W. Adams et al, eds. 1983).
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to Blackstone’s thinking in the Commentaries that law is “the plan
of the Creator for the happiness of mankind” (p. 20 n.48).22
Similarly, in Chapter 2, on James Wilson (who was a law
professor at what became the University of Pennsylvania while he
served as one of the six original Supreme Court Justices), Presser
writes how, just like Blackstone and Jefferson, Wilson viewed
“liberty and life” as the “gifts of heaven” (p. 34 n.86). Indeed,
Presser contends, Wilson may have inspired Jefferson’s thinking
in the Declaration of Independence (p. 34). And Wilson, rather
than Madison, may be justly characterized as the principal author
of the Constitution (p. 35), given that he spoke more at the
Convention than did Madison (p. 35), many of Madison’s specific
proposals at the Convention were rejected (p. 35 n.96), and the
initial drafts of the Constitution were apparently in Wilson’s
handwriting (p. 35). For Presser, Wilson is the American
Blackstone, not only in his intellectual influence in shaping the
American legal system, but also in his approach to law, which
Presser characterizes as “conservative” (p. 38), due largely to
Wilson’s prioritizing common over statutory law in embodying
the commands of nature.
But Wilson is the American version, meaning that he
democratized Blackstone’s understanding of sovereignty,
transplanting it from the English monarchical system to the
emerging American notion of a republican democracy. As Presser
writes, quoting Knapp, “James Wilson literally invented the
American people as a unitary sovereign entity” (p. 39 n.115). But
this did not mean for Wilson that the law has the power to
22. Presser also could have mentioned more broadly that God appears throughout
Jefferson’s thinking on individual liberty and moral order. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Bill
for
Establishing
Religious
Freedom
(1779),
https://founders.archives.gov
/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082(defending religious liberty on the ground
“that Almighty God hath created the mind free” as the “Holy Author of our religion”);
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, QUERY XVII (1784),
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/jefferson/ch17.html (proclaiming that although there is a
right “to say there are twenty gods, or no god,” because “[i]t neither picks my pockets nor
breaks my leg,” an atheist may justly be prohibited from testifying in court and be socially
stigmatized if he “cannot be relied on”); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA, QUERY XVIII (1784), http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/jefferson/ch18.html
(questioning whether “the liberties of a nation [can] be thought secure when we have
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties
are of the gift of God”). See also EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A
RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 135 (1996) (explaining why for Jefferson
“[t]he connection [between religion and morality] seemed so close as to make the two
virtually identical”).
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constrain merely because a majority of the sovereign consents.
Instead of adhering to this simple majoritarianism, Wilson held
that the validity of law also turns on its compliance with “the
science of human nature,” an inquiry guided by traditions and
customs—what Wilson dubbed “manners”—creating a link not
only between the American and British experience, but a link that
is traceable all the way back to the ancient Greeks and Romans
(p. 42).
In the next chapter, Presser profiles another law professorSupreme Court Justice, Joseph Story, who furthered Wilson’s
project of synthesizing natural law with American republican
democracy in the realm of constitutional law. Here, Presser
introduces the first case discussed in the book, Swift v. Tyson,23 a
Justice Story opinion holding that federal courts must apply
federal common law when exercising diversity jurisdiction. The
Swift decision, which was based on the idea that federal judges
have a unique insight into the commands of natural law, was
overruled almost one hundred years later, in Erie Railroad
Company v. Tompkins,24 a decision that almost ineluctably
followed once legal realism had overtaken the academy and
judiciary, bringing with it a distrust of any effort to interpret law
according to nature. Presser defends Swift, just as he defends
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, as being essential to
setting up a national system of government – not only for the
mercantile purpose of facilitating commerce but for the broader
purpose of constructing a unified American cultural identity.
Presser thus argues that Story was “deeply conservative, and
deeply influenced by English thinkers such as Blackstone and
Edmund Burke” (p. 52). Here, Presser views Story’s national
constitutionalism as consonant with President Lincoln’s and
Senator Sumner’s commitment to a “perpetual union,” but
apparently at odds with thinkers we might characterize as
Southern conservatives – thinkers like Jefferson, Calhoun, and
Randolph, who emphasized the importance of agrarian and local
communities in conserving tradition. In contrast to these
Southern localists, Story’s national constitutionalism, Presser
concludes, put Story in the company of “a nobler vision of
conservatism, one that is not wholly absent in the work of other
23.
24.

41 U.S. 1 (1842).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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‘Republican’ [in both the old and new sense of the term] Justices,
such as Samuel Chase, Richard Peters,25 Rufus Peckham, and
more recently William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
Thomas” (p. 60). Presser does not make entirely clear, however,
what makes this Northern, more mercantile, national
constitutionalism a “nobler” form of legal conservatism than its
Southern, more agrarian, localist counterpart. Nor does Presser
clarify what exactly makes Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas similar
to these 18th and 19th century judges.
A critical figure in Presser’s chronology of how the
conception of law in the academy has changed, away from the
natural and toward the positive, is Christopher Columbus
Langdell, the first Dean of Harvard Law School and the architect
of the case method. Although Presser provides a measured
defense of Langdell’s efforts to systematize and professionalize
legal education, Presser seems to agree with the prevailing view
in the legal academy that Langdell misunderstood the nature of
law in seeking to model legal studies after the natural sciences.
Presser hints that the real fault in Langdell’s approach, however,
is not its formalism, as the conventional critique generally holds,
but its scientism – namely, that Langdell’s “law as science”
approach cleared the way for the study of law to become the
empirical study of judicial behavior, a transition completed by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, for whom Presser arguably shows the
most hostility in what is otherwise a thoroughly even-tempered
book. Indeed, every romance novel must have a villain,
threatening to seduce away the protagonist’s love, just as Johan
Frederik Schlegel did to Kierkegaard’s Regine. And if Presser is
our hero, Holmes is our villain.
II. THE VILLAIN
Presser’s primary grievance against Holmes is that he was not
simply skeptical about the extent to which legal norms can
constrain judicial decision-making, as was the case for all of the
realists, but he was also terribly cynical about human nature.
Many biographical accounts of Holmes have attributed his

25. There seems to be a typographical error in referring to Judge Peters as a Supreme
Court Justice (p. 60). In 1792, President Washington appointed Peters to the United States
District Court for the District of Pennsylvania, a position he occupied until his death in
1828.
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cynicism to the Civil War, in which he fought valiantly after
having enlisted while still a Senior at Harvard College. He was
badly wounded in battle and some scholars have speculated that
witnessing the despair and horror of a bloody ideological battle
left him without a strong moral compass for the remaining 70
years of his life.26 Indeed, his violent first-hand experience with
what he would later call “fighting faiths”27 seems to have
transformed his youthful idealism, which bore some of the
transcendentalism of Emerson,28 into a more detached moral
pragmatism, which often times approached a Nietzschean
nihilism.29
Throughout Law Professors, Presser is overwhelmingly kind
and respectful in his treatment of the profiled scholars, even those
whom Presser criticizes, but, as mentioned above, he is perhaps
the harshest on Holmes, in ways that may not be entirely
defensible. Not only does Presser neglect important biographical
details (such as some of the information above about Holmes’s
involvement in and views on the Civil War) that may give the
reader a more sympathetic understanding of his callousness,30 but
Presser may be guilty also of overstating Holmes’s agency in
denaturalizing law.
26. This horror is heart-breakingly captured on the back of an envelope of a letter a
young Holmes wrote to his parents: “Write as often as poss. It is still kill–kill–all the time.”
TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR. 1861-1864 137 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 2000). Many years later, Holmes would write
to Learned Hand that he did not have any children, because “this is not the kind of world
I want to bring anyone else into.” G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 106 (1993). The memory of the Civil War seemed to
haunt Holmes throughout his life, leading him, in 1932, when he retired from the bench at
the age of 90, to cry while reading to Felix Frankfurter’s wife, Marion Frankfurter, a poem
about the Civil War. As Holmes is reported to have told Lewis Einstein, “after the Civil
War the world never seemed quite right again.” Lewis Einstein, Introduction, in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS
EINSTEIN, at xvi (James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964).
27. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28. On Emerson’s influence on Holmes, see ALLEN MENDENHALL, OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES JR., PRAGMATISM, AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AGON: AESTHETIC
DISSENT AND THE COMMON LAW (2016).
29. On this connection between Holmes and Nietzsche, see Allen Mendenhall and
Seth Vannatta, The American Nietzsche? Fate and Power in the Philosophy of O.W.
Holmes, Jr., 85 UMKC L. REV. 187 (2016).
30. Presser does mention in passing Holmes’s involvement in the Civil War as an
explanation for some of his “unsavory qualit[ies],” but he does not explore this explanation
in any detail (p. 86). This is particularly surprising, given the detail and attention Presser
gives to the other profiled scholars, bringing them to life in a way that inevitably
complicates any criticism of their ideas.
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On this latter point, that of Holmes’s agency, three issues are
worth addressing here. One, as Brian Tamanaha has argued, in his
excellent book Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide, many of
Holmes’s contemporaries argued that he had essentially created a
strawman in critiquing Langdell,31 because few practitioners had
ever held such a strictly logical view of law, and even the
purportedly formalist academics, like Langdell, were much more
practically oriented and anchored to the ground than the realists
later suggested they were. Two, Holmes, while mocking formalists
for their logical rigidity, also took great pride in being constrained
by law, famously professing, for example, that “[i]t has given me
great pleasure to sustain the Constitutionality of laws that I
believe to be as bad as possible, because I thereby helped to mark
the difference between what I would forbid and what the
Constitution permits.”32 Three, given the relatively thin line
between formalism and realism that existed in the real world, the
complaints coming from the so-called realists could be understood
as more political than theoretical in both content and purpose.
That is, the realists were not as concerned with the interpretive
methodology the so-called “formalists” employed, as they were
with the fact that many of these formalists were political
conservatives resisting the economic and cultural transformation
wrought by rapid industrialization, bureaucratic centralization,
and unprecedented levels of immigration. In other words, the
realists, to advance their political agenda, used the logical
nomenclature of formalism to signify that their opponents were
driven by a mechanical simplicity that was out of a step with
changing times. Understood in this light, cases like Lochner v.
New York33 were not bad because they were actually formalist
decisions; rather, they were bad, in the realists’ view, because they
were based on bad economic policy.34
31. For a discussion of many of these contemporaneous criticisms of Holmes, see
BRIAN Z, TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING 27–43 (2009). As an example of one of these contemporaneous
criticisms, see, Jabez Fox, Law and Logic, 14 HARV. L. REV. 39, 42 (1900).
32. NORMAN DORSEN, THE EMBATTLED CONSTITUTION 58 (2013). Many have
pointed to this quote as an example of Holmes’s cruelty, in that he took pride in following
the law even when it would undermine his notion of social justice. But this quote also
weakens the idea that Holmes was a robust realist, eager to bend his understanding of the
law to his will.
33. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
34. Indeed, Lochner, which is often excoriated for invaliding labor laws based on a
formalist theory about the “freedom of contract,” was in fact much less formalist than, say,
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This suggests that Presser’s villain is not really Holmes but a
time period, the ethos that came to pervade American law and
politics in the early 20th century. To be sure, Holmes was
eventually used to further this progressive agenda, but his actual
ideas about law may have had little agency in creating that
movement. As is often the case with the villain in a love story, the
problem was in the relationship itself, as much as we might want
to blame the villain for adulterating our vision of that relationship.
To push this analogy further, there was already something wrong
with late-19th century American law, from Presser’s point of view,
before Holmes, and there would have been something deeply
wrong in 21st century American law even without Holmes.
Presser’s analysis therefore would have benefitted from a
discussion of the surrounding changes in American public life—
such as secularization and centralization—that almost certainly
contributed more than Holmes to what Presser sees as the
adulteration of American law. By ignoring these practical
circumstances, and focusing instead only on the legal ideas
themselves, Presser may be justly charged with committing the
central vice that he condemns in his book—that of thinking too
much like a law professor, in legal abstractions, detached from
practical realities.
Presser’s next few chapters are dedicated to other prominent
legal realists—Wigmore, Pound, and Llewellyn. In these chapters,
Presser emphasizes how they did not actually go quite as far as
Holmes in repudiating legal traditionalism. Indeed, Presser notes,
even Llewellyn, whose Bramble Bush is famous for its robust
realism, did not accommodate himself to legal inconsistency in the
way that Holmes had, despite defining law, similar to how Holmes
had in The Path of the Law, as “[w]hat [legal] officials do about
disputes” (p. 138).
These chapters are consistent with the points made above—
i.e., that many of the so-called realists were not nearly as devoted
to uprooting conventional legal conceptions as some later
theorists would have us believe. These chapters are also important
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which derived a rigid trimester formula from an abstract
concept of privacy, or Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which derived a highly
complicated three-pronged test based on a theory of what it means to establish religion.
Roe and Lemon are generally embraced by 21st century progressives, not because they are
more anchored to practical realities, but simply because these decisions are generally
viewed as having salutary outcomes of promoting gender equality and secularism.
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reminders that the early realists were not principally concerned
with constitutional law and theory. Wigmore of course was an
expert in evidence law, Pound in tort law, and Llewellyn in
contract law. While some early realists, such as Judge Jerome
Frank, can certainly be charged with seeking to overhaul our legal
system altogether, the majority of the realists during this period,
including Wigmore, Pound, and Llewellyn, had more modest
ambitions, seeking rather to refine and reform their particular
areas of study.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the individual agendas of
Wigmore, Pound, and Llewellyn may have been relatively
modest, and changing social and economic circumstances may
have been more responsible than any of their respective ideas for
what Presser perceives to be the adulteration of American law, all
of these realists, along with Holmes, undoubtedly contributed to
the notion that judges do, and should, exercise significant
discretion in interpreting legal norms. And once this
understanding of law became settled within the academy, the
politicization of the judiciary verged on the inevitable, illustrated
nicely in how the preponderance of the second half of Presser’s
book is dedicated to legal scholars devoted in one way or another
to justifying the Warren Court agenda.
Two transitional figures along this path are Felix Frankfurter
(profiled in Chapter 9) and Herbert Wechsler (profiled in
Chapter 11).35 Frankfurter and Wechsler are fascinating figures,
made all the more intriguing by their placement in Presser’s book,
nearly half-way through the twenty-four chapters. After having
read the entire book, the reader may leave with the impression
that these two figures, and these two chapters, represent the true
middle-point in Presser’s narrative, in that both Frankfurter and
Wechsler straddled legal formalism and realism, adhering to a
Holmesian model of judicial restraint even after it had outlived its
original purpose of permitting greater economic regulation.
Frankfurter and Wechsler are, moreover, the first two Jewish
scholars featured in the book, and they, ironically, stirred up
controversy for their perceived insensitivity on constitutional
issues relating to cultural pluralism. In Presser’s romance with the
law, we can think of these two thinkers as representing a
35. C. P. Snow’s fictional Lewis Eliot is sandwiched in between Frankfurter and
Wechsler (in Chapter 10).
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reconciliation of sorts, not quite fulfilling the promise of the
honeymoon period, but cutting back on some of the excesses
wrought by the realists.
III. RECONCILIATION
The chapter on Frankfurter highlights how he contributed to
the emerging political identity of the law professor. Indeed, as a
Harvard Law School professor, before his 1939 appointment to the
Supreme Court, Frankfurter had an active political agenda, even
serving as a personal adviser to FDR. In stark contrast with this
activist agenda as a professor, however, Frankfurter had a
restrained constitutional vision as a Supreme Court Justice,
holding that separation-of-power and rule-of-law principles
severely circumscribe the power of judicial review, particularly in
cases involving coordinate branches of the federal government.
Frankfurter, unlike Holmes, was doctrinaire in applying this
theory, because Frankfurter saw judicial restraint as a
constitutional command, unchanging with time—not as a practical
expedient, as the pragmatic Holmes viewed it. This led
Frankfurter to take increasingly conservative positions over the
years, as progressive scholars and judges, having established that
economic legislation would not be subject to exacting scrutiny,
began to push for closer judicial review of social legislation,
particularly when such legislation had a deleterious impact on
“discrete and insular minorities.”36
In covering Frankfurter’s transition, from New Deal virtuoso
to Warren Court pariah, Presser focuses on Frankfurter’s Barnette
dissent,37 which is of course famous for its highly vitriolic,
passionate, and personal language.38 After that point, in which the
Court made the abrupt decision of overruling itself only three
years after Minersville School District v. Gobitis,39 Frankfurter’s
conservatism seemed to harden, though perhaps Presser is too
hard on Frankfurter in alleging that “Frankfurter did not have the
sympathy for racial and ethnic minorities which generally
characterized the Warren Court” (p. 174). This might be an
36. U.S. v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
37. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
38. He began the dissent by declaring that, as a Jew, he “belong[ed] to the most
vilified and persecuted minority in history.” Id.
39. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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overstatement, given that Frankfurter consistently demonstrated
a strong compassion for the plight of African Americans,40 but it
is certainly true that Frankfurter wrote his Barnette dissent with
an extreme insensitivity toward religious minorities, exhorting
them to assimilate into the dominant American Anglo-Saxon
Protestant culture just as he had. Generally, however, it’s not so
much that Frankfurter was unsympathetic toward minorities as
much as he was an assimilationist, eager for everyone to conform
to his Anglophilic ideal. Likewise, Frankfurter at times seemed
indifferent, even hostile, toward his own Jewish descent, marrying
a non-Jewish woman and regarding his Judaism as a mere
“accident of birth” (p. 152), but he was, at least at one point,
Presser notes, an ardent Zionist, lobbying for the Balfour
Declaration and participating in the founding conference of
the American Jewish Congress.
Presser suggests that Frankfurter has a mixed legacy with
modern-day scholars because he was himself conflicted. Indeed,
it seems that Frankfurter was, at heart, a Wilsonian and FDR
Democrat, and he had difficulty adjusting to the emerging New
Left, leading various elements of his brilliance to shine at different
points on the ideological spectrum, not always in ways that we
tend to find appealing in the 21st century.41 There is at least some
coherence to be found at the conclusion of his incredibly
successful though enigmatic life, with Frankfurter asking his
friend, Professor Louis Henkin, an Orthodox Jew, to speak at his
funeral—as Frankfurter explained, “I came into the world a Jew
and although I did not live my life entirely as a Jew, I think it is
fitting that I should leave as a Jew” (p. 152 n.494).
Wechsler similarly contained many contradictions. Like
Frankfurter, Wechsler was a liberal in many ways, but he assailed
40. Indeed, Frankfurter was closely involved in founding the ACLU in 1920; he
served as a legal and policy advisor on the NAACP’s National Legal Committee in the
decade preceding his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1939; and he hired the first
African-American Supreme Court clerk nearly a decade later in 1948. Moreover,
Frankfurter was indirectly responsible for Brown v. Board of Education, in recommending
in 1930 that the NAACP commission one of his former students, Nathan Margold, to
construct a 218-page report that mapped out a brilliant and highly successful litigation path
toward desegregation. See STEPHEN WHITFIELD, JEWISH FATES, ALTERED STATES, IN
JEWISH ROOTS IN SOUTHERN SOIL: A NEW HISTORY 304, 317 (Marcie Ferris et al. eds.,
2006).
41. A case could be made that Frankfurter was essentially a proto-neoconservative,
given his support for a powerful centralized government, his eagerness for global
engagement, and his racially egalitarian but assimilationist leanings.
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the most cherished progressive principle, racial egalitarianism,
and he did this by challenging the constitutional validity of its
greatest triumph, Brown v. Board of Education.42 Presser devotes
several pages to exploring why and how Wechsler advanced his
nearly blasphemous view—in Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law,43 one of the most controversial law review
articles of all time—that Brown was an illegitimate exercise of
judicial review because it did not rest on neutral principles of law.
In that article, Wechsler defined a “neutral principle” as
consisting of two elements—content generality and equal
applicability. Applying these criteria, Weschler argued that a
principled decision rests on “reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved,”44 and applies to all parties
equally, “whether a labor union or a taxpayer, a Negro or a
segregationist, a corporation or a Communist.”45
In analyzing the Wechsler article, Presser may be charged
with seeing too much conservatism in the argument. Wechsler’s
argument, after all, was ostentatiously disinterested in stare
decisis, federalism, originalism, and majoritarianism.46 To the
contrary, Wechsler’s principal problem with the Brown decision
was its lack of neutrality—specifically how, in distinguishing the
Plessy line of cases, the Court limited its reasoning to public
education and grounded this distinction on highly questionable
social science. At the end of the article, Wechsler claimed that
whereas the Brown decision could not be defended on equalprotection grounds, it arguably could be justified through a
freedom of association for people who desired integration. But
that led Wechsler to wonder how a court could justify the right to
integration in freedom-of-association principles, without also
giving rise to the complementary right, that of segregationists not
to associate with other races. Wechsler conceded that he “[w]ould
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Indeed, Wechsler specifically conceded that several things that bothered other
critics of the decision did not bother him. In particular, Wechsler explained that he was not
bothered that Brown implicitly overruled long-settled precedent, that it required the
transformation of social traditions prevailing in a large swath of the nation, that it was
ostensibly at odds with the original meaning of the 14th Amendment, that it was contrary
to popular will, and that it may have been premature in preempting congressional action.
Id. at 31–32.
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like to think there is [only the right to integrative association], but
I confess that I have not yet written the opinion”47 demonstrating
how preferring the integrationist’s over the segregationist’s
freedom of association would be a neutral principle. Writing such
an opinion, Wechsler concluded, is the “challenge of the schoolsegregation cases.” 48
Presser may have overstated Wechsler’s conservatism in
overlooking the extent to which Wechsler engaged here in the
very type of reasoning that he was condemning – the crafting and
tailoring of doctrines with an eye constantly averted toward
particular policy outcomes. As later scholars would point out,
Wechsler’s neutral principles project was doomed from the start,
because it did not consider requiring courts to derive such neutral
principles through neutral interpretive methodologies.49 This
realization gave rise to the interpretive crises of the 1970s, which
Presser explores in Chapter 14 by examining six leading scholars
within the Critical Legal Studies movement (“CLS”), and in
Chapter 15 by profiling University of Chicago Law Professor and
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, the principal architect of
the Law and Economics movement (“LE”).
Both CLS and LE represent what we may characterize as a
second infidelity to Presser’s traditional view of the nature of law.
And just as how a second infidelity almost invariably relates to the
first, but may be more audacious, pushing the boundary of the
relationship to challenge the sustainability of the marriage, we see
in both CLS and LE two brazen and radical extensions of legal
realism.
IV. A SECOND INFIDELITY
On the surface, the LE and CLS movements represent
radically divergent ideological perspectives, with LE making
efficiency the central criterion of a legal system and CLS arguing
that such an emphasis on efficiency promotes inter-personal
alienation through the instantiation of structural economic
exploitation (to use the CLS Marxist nomenclature). But in fact
LE and CLS—both born in the 1970s, following the triumph of
47. Id. at 34.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
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legal realism in the academy and the Warren Court over the
nation—share a view of law that was at one time utterly foreign
to the American legal academy: the view that law is nothing more
than an instrument for political power. This view, expressed most
stridently in the CLS dictum “law is politics,” represents the total
denunciation of the traditional view that law is the expression of
a divine order naturally inhering in human relations.
Thus, when Presser questions whether it could be that CLS
and LE scholars “actually live in different legal worlds” (p. 296),
it may be one of the few times when Presser’s prose misses the
mark. CLS and LE occupy the exact same legal world—one where
law is merely an instrument of power—but they occupy different
political worlds. Whereas LE sought to impose objectivity on the
law, it held, just as CLS, that this order did not necessarily inhere
in nature or legal norms themselves. For LE, it was the duty of
judges to create that order, and the LE scholars sought
economically savvy judges like Posner to perform that task. CLS
scholars, by contrast, thought that any such efforts to impose
objectivity and order would fail, and, moreover, would inevitably
result in class, gender, and racial exploitation and alienation. The
Crits therefore sought judges who would reject all pretensions of
legal objectivity and consistency, in an effort to overcome and
eradicate the surface-level distinctions responsible for intersubjective alienation.
Essentially, then, LE and CLS scholars disagreed simply on
how to achieve a well-ordered society. Their disputes over
economic models and human alienation were, at bottom, political
and indeed moral disagreements. This, of course, is what has
generated the truism, “We are all legal realists now”—which in
fact has become such a truism that it is difficult to attribute the
quote to a single source,50 leading Michael Steven Green to make
the meta-observation that it “has become a cliché to call it a
‘cliché.’”51 Whether law is politics, or law is economics, both CLS
and LE represent the same legal world: a world where law is not
law.

50. Presser is one of the few scholars to cite a source, (p. 134 n.433), tracing it to
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988). To my
knowledge, this is the first time the phrase was used.
51. Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1917 (2005).
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It is worth noting here that Presser chose to cover Ronald
Dworkin in Chapter 12, immediately after the Wechsler chapter,
apparently under the reasoning that this placement was ideally
suited to demonstrate how Dworkin used his “law as moral
principle” approach to combat Wechsler’s “neutral principles”
assault on the Warren Court legacy. But it may have made more
sense for Presser to discuss Dworkin after the CLS and LE
chapters, in addition to after the chapters on the related critical
scholars Catharine MacKinnon (Chapter 17) and Patricia
Williams (Chapter 21), given that so much of Dworkin’s work
sought to defuse the CLS attack on the objectivity of legal
thought, while still legitimizing many of its policy goals. Indeed,
the astute reader will notice how Chapter 16 (on Bruce Ackerman
and Akhil Amar) works in consonance with Chapter 12 (on
Dworkin) to illustrate how these post-Crit thinkers developed
highly sophisticated and arguably formalistic theories of law, in an
effort to rise above the nihilism of CLS, while still, coincidentally,
defending legal positions that match up almost perfectly with the
political goals of CLS, and moreover, entirely with the
Democratic Party’s agenda over the last 50 years.52
The back-and-forth in these late chapters creates a dizzying
effect, which plays into Presser’s wonderful and meandering way
of unfolding his narrative, but perhaps at the price of telling a
more coherent and linear story, whereby the Crits responded to
the supposed neutrality of the Wechsler “process school” by
extending and radicalizing realism in a way that was later justified
and legitimated by progressively minded scholars like Ackerman
and Dworkin.
Presser astutely notes how although CLS may be dead (in the
sense that very few legal scholars still write with the radical tone
and esoteric style as people like Kennedy, Gabel, and Unger did
52. One might even sense from these chapters the implication that Dworkin and
Ackerman did more to distance a traditionalist like Presser from American legal discourse
than CLS did or ever could have, because while critical scholars sought a candid and
transparent exploration of power relations in American law and politics, Dworkin and
Ackerman sought to justify transformations of power, such as the expansion of federal
authority in the New Deal or the rights revolution of the Warren Court, under cryptic
appeals to underlying moral principles and popular sovereignty. That is not to take
anything away from either Dworkin’s or Ackerman’s account of law—to the contrary, both
projects are highly interesting and compelling. But if one looks at them ideologically, in
terms of how they serviced the progressive cause of making legal discourse more
egalitarian, Dworkin and Ackerman may have done more than CLS to render any
challenge to progressive politics outside the legal mainstream.
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in the 1970s and 80s), CLS politics are very much still alive. As a
primary example of this, Presser points to the Obama Presidency,
arguing in the chapter on CLS, and alluded to again in the chapter
on the President himself, that Obama represents “the unfolding
of some of the ideas promoted by critical legal studies”—
particularly how “legal actors can reshape the institutions of the
market economy and even of democracy itself” (p. 295). Presser
could have made an even more radical claim here, one that does
not so unfairly single out President Obama as bearing particular
responsibility for pushing this agenda.
That radical claim is this: The bulk of the legal academy, not
just a few radical outliers, can be characterized as responsible for
carrying the CLS torch, at least in terms of policy goals and
ideological orientation. If you consider, for example, the Merrick
Garland-inspired wish lists recently issued by Crits like Tushnet53
and progressive non-Crits like Chemerinsky,54 as they
contemplated what the Supreme Court’s agenda might be like
under a Hillary Clinton presidency, their visions were almost
identical: Both involved the full deployment of federal resources
to pursue race-conscious and wealth-redistributive policies in an
effort to secure a truly egalitarian society.
Understood in this light, CLS was not necessarily that radical
in its politics, but rather in its theory of what law is and how we
should talk about it. Put differently, once the hard part of
transforming power relations within the legal academy and the
broader legal culture was complete, so that nearly every law
school in the country became associated with various progressive
causes, CLS, as a deconstructive theory of power in law, had little
to offer the legal left, which after this power transition was faced
with the different task of legitimating and justifying its newfound
power on more permanent grounds. This project was pursued
under more formalistic theories, such as Dworkin’s underlying
principles, Ackerman’s constitutional moments, and Amar’s
common-law constitutionalism.

53. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism,
BALKANIZATION (May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defen
sive-crouch-liberal.html.
54. Erwin Chemerinsky, What If the Supreme Court Were Liberal?, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/what-if-the-supremecourt-were-liberal/477018.
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That raises a related point that would have been interesting
for Presser to pursue here: If we understand CLS as a theory of
power relations in law, as opposed to a specific set of desired
policy outcomes, what makes it necessarily a left-wing
movement? The Crits, themselves, to be sure, were all leftists,
seeking to use critical theory for the thoroughly egalitarian
purpose of deconstructing the various class, race, and gender
hierarchies structuring the American legal system. But their
theory of law need not be deployed for such ends. Indeed, CLS is
in many ways the Anglo-American adaptation of a philosophy of
law that first appeared, and is still much more common in,
Continental Europe, where it is not thought of as inherently
progressive—in fact, it is most often associated with the right-wing
German theorist, Carl Schmitt.
Three distinct but related patterns underlying the
transformation of American legal, political, and social power may
make critical legal theory a particularly good fit for how
conservatives think about legal texts and judicial authority in 21st
century America. Law Professors suggests but does not explicate
these points. I will briefly do so here, for the purpose of
highlighting what I believe to be a critical theme underlying the
book.
One, there are few—and decreasingly few—voices in the
academy and judiciary representing a traditionally conservative
view of law. Presser notes in various places how much the legal
academy has changed demographically and ideologically over the
last seventy-five years—going from overwhelmingly Christian,
and, at least in some sense, socially conservative, to
disproportionately Jewish and radically progressive (p. 153 n.495,
p. 320, p. 348).55 On this point, Presser cites a study finding that 82
55. The ethnic component of this transformation is largely due to the fact that, well
into the 1950s, there were rigid quotas on the number of Jewish students and professors at
elite universities. For a fascinating historical account of the Jewish experience in Ivy
League universities, particularly at Yale, see DAN A. OREN, JOINING THE CLUB: A
HISTORY OF JEWS AND YALE (1986). See also Stephen Steinberg, How Jewish Quotas
Began, COMMENTARY (Sept. 1, 1971), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/
articles/how-jewish-quotas-began. The transformation of the American legal academy
after the Jewish quota was lifted is perhaps represented most strikingly in that Frankfurter
was the only full-time Jewish faculty member at Harvard Law School until at least 1929.
But just 41 years later, after the quotas had been lifted, Robert Burt observed how, despite
representing only two percent of the overall population, Jews represented 25 percent of all
American law school professors and 38 percent of “elite” American law school professors
(p. 153 n.495). For a more comprehensive study of gender, ethnic, and political diversity in
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percent of law professors identity as Democrat voters (p. 320), but
as striking as that number is, he could have pushed this point much
further. The percentage is actually much higher if the few rightleaning and Christian schools are excluded from the calculation.
And the percentage is even higher than that at the most elite law
schools, demonstrated in Nick Rosencranz’s recent observation
that 98 percent of the Georgetown Law faculty can be fairly
characterized as left-wing, with one of the three right-of-center
faculty members being the socially progressive libertarian Randy
Barnett.56
Two, as a result of there being almost no traditionalists left in
the academy, the few scholars endorsing natural law or
originalism are overwhelmingly socially progressive, more often
identifying as libertarian than conservative.57 There are precious
few scholars practicing Bork’s brand of originalism, structured by
a traditional cultural framework. Presser generally ignores this
distinction between libertarians and traditional conservatives,58
which is a shame, because it is an increasingly significant
distinction in conservative legal thought, particularly as the
distinction relates to theories of originalism, natural law, and
judicial review.59

the legal academy, underscoring the unrepresentativeness of its demography and ideology,
see James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, 39 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 89, 118 (2016) (“By ratios, the most overrepresented group is white male
Jewish Democrats. They are overrepresented by a ratio of nearly 28 to 1.”).
56. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Intellectual Diversity in the Legal Academy, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 137 (2014) (“We are a faculty of 120, and, to my knowledge,
the number of professors who are openly conservative, or libertarian, or Republican or, in
any sense, to the right of the American center, is three—three out of 120. There are more
conservatives on the nine-member United States Supreme Court than there are on this
120-member faculty. Moreover, the ideological median of the other 117 seems to lie not
just left of center, but closer to the left edge of the Democratic Party. Many are further left
than that.”) (internal citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2013). On the growing convergence between mainstream
(i.e., progressive) constitutionalism and libertarian constitutionalism, see David E.
Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The Mainstreaming of Libertarian Constitutionalism, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (2015).
58. Presser explores libertarianism only obliquely—through Posner’s work in law
and economics, and Sunstein’s (ostensibly oxymoronic) “libertarian paternalism” (ch. 22).
59. For that reason, it is regrettable that Presser’s only discussion of right-of-center
libertarianism is through Posner’s pragmatic and decidedly non-natural law contributions
to the LE movement. Had Presser included Randy Barnett among the profiled law
professors, it would have given Presser an opportunity to explore the increasingly fractured
coalition between traditionalists and libertarians, both within law and the larger
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Three, because most originalist scholars now are not
traditionalists, a “New Originalism” has emerged, opening up a
path for libertarian-oriented scholars to make socially progressive
arguments, such as for open borders60 and same-sex marriage.61
But just as Presser overlooks the increasingly important
distinction within the legal right between traditionalists and
libertarians, Presser treats originalism as a monolithic theory,
overlooking the many variations that have arisen in originalism
scholarship over the last decade—almost all of which point
toward the left-end of the ideological spectrum.
Thus, given these three transformations within the legal
academy relating to tradition, natural law, and originalism,
Presser’s CLS analysis would have benefitted from a more
creative and forward-looking exploration of whether a critical
approach to law may eventually become more aligned with the
legal right than the legal left. To be clear, that is not to suggest the
possibility of conservatives becoming full-fledged Crits who see
law, in its essence, as nothing more than power. There is obviously
something about conservatism that ultimately requires seeing the
“permanence” in things, as Russell Kirk so eloquently put it.62 But
if conservatives now truly see the “irremediable corruption of our
legal culture,”63 as Justice Alito recently alleged in his Obergefell
dissent, conservatives may very well conclude that conventional
conservative movement. The traditionalist-libertarian fracture on natural law is largely
traceable to Robert Bork’s objection to natural law as a guide for judicial decisionmaking.
60. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Immigration and the US Constitution, OPEN
BORDERS (Mar. 18, 2013), https://openborders.info/blog/immigration-and-the-usconstitution.
61. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex
Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016); Michael Ramsey, Is There an Originalist Case
for Same-Sex Marriage?, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 25, 2013), http://originalismblog.
typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2013/03/is-there-an-originalist-case-for-same-sex-marr
iagemichael-ramsey.html; Ilya Somin, Originalism Is Broad Enough To Include Arguments
for a Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/originalism-isbroad-enough-to-include-arguments-for-a-constitutional-right-to-same-sex-marriage/?
tid=a_inl&utm_term=.39a1adc906fc.
62. RUSSELL KIRK, What Is Conservatism?, in THE ESSENTIAL RUSSELL KIRK:
SELECTED ESSAYS (George Panichas ed., 2014) (“The Permanence of a state, roughly
speaking, is its conservative interest . . . .”).
63. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2643 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). On the
significance of Justice Alito’s reference to the “irremediable corruption of our legal
culture,” particularly in signifying the failures of constitutional conservatism, see Nelson
Lund’s excellent essay. Nelson Lund, The Corruption of Constitutional Conservatism,
CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.claremont.org/crb/basic
page/the-corruption-of-constitutional-conservatism.
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modes of conservative legal reasoning, such as formalism and
originalism, will serve only to reinforce the liberal cultural and
legal hegemony.
Presser comes the closest to addressing how a critical
approach to law can provide insight into this transformation of
power when Presser argues that CLS can best explain why
President Obama, along with Attorney General Eric Holder, felt
justified in using the authority of the Department of Justice to
weigh in on the Ferguson controversy (in favor of the black victim
and against the white police officer) before the facts involving the
shooting had been resolved (p. 290 n.877). Presser also could have
mentioned here other examples of the Obama Administration
interpreting the law and legal events through the subjective,
thereby weakening the notion that objectivity and certainty
inhere in legal norms.64 If Presser is right in characterizing the
Obama Administration as a CLS presidency, it would suggest
that, in the forty years since the height of the CLS movement in
the 1970s, the power dynamics of the nation have undergone such
an enormous shift that CLS values, particularly as applied to
matters like racial justice and sexual identity, have become part of
the very power structure the Crits assailed.

If CLS values are indeed forming a new power structure, and
that is certainly a plausible proposition in light of the
transformations of the legal academy covered in Presser’s book,65
64. For example, after being charged that his “Justice Department went easy in a
voting rights case against members of the New Black Panther Party because they are
African American,” Attorney General Holder dismissed the charge on the ground that
any threat to the voting rights of non-blacks was not comparable to the disenfranchisement
of “my people.” Josh Gerstein, Eric Holder: Black Panther Case Focus Demeans “My
People,” POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2011/03/
eric-holder-black-panther-case-focus-demeans-my-people-033839.
Similarly,
after
Trayvon Martin’s tragic death, President Obama claimed that “it is absolutely imperative
that we investigate every aspect of this, and that everybody pulls together—federal, state
and local—to figure out exactly how this tragedy happened.” Obama severed the link
betweeen legal norms and the subjective by exhorting the nation to legal action while
contemplating that “[i]f I had a son, he’d look like Trayvon.” Krissah Thompson & Scott
Wilson, Obama on Trayvon Martin: “If I Had a Son, He’d Look Like Trayvon,” WASH.
POST (Mar. 23, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-if-i-had-a-son-hedlook-like-trayvon/2012/03/23/gIQApKPpVS_story.html?utm_term=.d28004f93d00.
65. A fascinating parallel can be found in the positions of civil liberties organizations
like the ACLU—which was founded in 1920 to protect political dissidents and civil liberties
from majoritarian authority, but now often works in tandem with government to penalize
dissidents who violate non-discrimination norms. See, for example, the ACLU’s
participation with Washington State in a lawsuit against a florist who, for religious reasons,
refused to create a floral arrangement for a same-sex wedding. See Kirk Johnson, Florist
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that power transformation may eventually change the way that
legal concepts like formalism and originalism relate to the
ideological spectrum.66 This is a particularly timely point in light
of the 2016 populist revolt and the attendant judicial resistance
against President Trump’s immigration agenda. Presser cannot
be faulted for completing his book before the ideological shakeup wrought by the 2016 election. But long before that election
there were signs of the dissolution of National Review-style
conservatism.67 And Presser’s analysis would have been more
provocative, timely, and compelling had it strayed more from
conventional partisan talking points and considered what this
dissolution might augur for our undersatndings of the legal
academy, CLS, and the legal right.
Similarly, just as Presser’s analysis would have benefited
from probing the relationship between CLS and the legal left, it
likewise would have benefited from questioning what makes LE
a right-wing school of thought, as it is often represented. Indeed,
Presser notes how Posner, before he was so critical of originalism
and various social conservative causes, was “a darling of the
right,” thereby earning a federal judicial nomination from
President Reagan in 1981 (p. 303). But Presser does not explore
why Posner was, and to some extent still is, considered
conservative. This is especially curious given Presser’s affiliation
with paleoconservatism, which has been characterized by just as
much skepticism toward big business and the fetishization of
capital, as skepticism toward capital’s confiscation and
redistribution. For paleocons, unlimited global capitalism and
statist centralization are equally problematic because they can be
equally destructive of community and family life.

Discriminated Against Gay Couple, Washington State Supreme Court Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/florist-discrimination-gaycouple-washington-court.html.
66. Indeed, some recent trends in American law and culture have led legal scholars
to observe a growing left-wing patriotism and interest in originalism. For a fascinating
argument on this point, linking an emerging “liberal originalism” with the racial and
cultural dynamics of the Broadway hit Hamilton, see Richard Primus, Will LinManuel Miranda Transform the Supreme Court?, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/lin-manuel-miranda-and-the-future-oforiginalism/485651.
67. On the decreasing currency of National Review-style conservatism among the
American electorate, see GEORGE HAWLEY, RIGHT-WING CRITICS OF AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM (2016).
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The crux of why paleoconservatives like Presser have so little
in common with libertarians of Posner’s (or Barnett’s) ilk is that
such libertarians make choice the ultimate touchstone of human
freedom, without apparently considering that choice in a world
untethered to and deracinated from social connection and cultural
meaning will have little relationship to what many human beings
want out of that freedom. For this reason, at least some concern
for a nation’s tradition and cultural heritage is critical to a legal
version of paleoconservatism, a concern that libertarians like
Posner often times seem to lack. In fact, when framed in this light,
the Crits and paleocons have much more in common with each
other than either does with LE or libertarianism, at least in terms
of the importance to human happiness of living a spiritually
fulfilling and meaningful life. Although a Crit like Tushnet and a
paleocon like Presser would agree on very little in designing a
blueprint for constructing that meaning, they at least would have
a lot to discuss in terms of making the law fulfill this need, a
conversation in which many LE and libertarian scholars would
have little interest in participating.

And while the Crits and paleocons would agree on very little,
they would certainly agree on some things, and moreover, these
would almost certainly be things on which they would sharply
disagree with LE types. This is evident, for example, in Presser’s
sympathetic treatment of Catherine MacKinnon’s argument that
pornography is a social evil that must be regulated, a view that
LE scholars generally reject because it undermines individual
choice—no matter how much that choice undermines a life with
meaning, for both men and women alike, pornographic actors as
well as viewers.
Probing such ideological mash-ups would have enriched
Presser’s love letter, just as reflecting on past romances and
connections can yield new realizations about one’s current
relationship. This is a point we will return to in our final section,
on the rocky future of the relationship between traditionalism and
law, where we will see that perhaps the real villains for traditional
conservatives like Presser are not necessarily the realists and
Crits. The real villain is the culture that has prevented legal
conservatism from conserving the cultural and moral core of the
American legal system.
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V. A ROCKY FUTURE

Three of the closing chapters (Chapters 18-20) cover diverse
members of the legal conservative movement. That movement,
born in the early 1980s with the creation of the Federalist Society,
sought to reverse much of the Warren Court’s legacy, while
grounding that reversal in a distinctly conservative theory of
law—what came to be known as originalism in the constitutional
context and textualism in the statutory context. Chapter 18, on
Mary Ann Glendon, is a magnificent dedication to a brilliant
woman, one who does not get enough attention in commentary
on the most prolific legal scholars—partly, perhaps, because her
work has focused on family law rather than the glamour and glitz
of constitutional law and theory.68 One of Glendon’s greatest
contributions is Rights Talk,69 which pointed to the dark
underbelly of rights—namely how they often serve to atomize and
sever individuals from a life with meaning. Presser notes how
Glendon’s interrogation of rights discourse has some resonance
with the CLS critique of law, but “with Glendon it has a strongly
conservative rather than a strongly progressive coloration” (p.
364).70 Glendon, more than any of the scholars included in the
book, understands that many of America’s problems, those that
concern people across the ideological spectrum, are, at their core,
cultural, and as such, are not easily susceptible to resolution by
law professors – or indeed, by the legal system at all.
Chapters 19 and 20 focus on two particularly controversial
law professors—Paul Carrington and Antonin Scalia. Carrington
is controversial for his commentary on legal education, including
his desire to shorten law school matriculation, his questioning
whether the Crits belong on law school faculties, and his criticism
of affirmative action in law school admissions. In the Carrington
chapter, one can perhaps most brightly see the arc of Presser’s
love letter, with Carrington representing a lost era—the southern
romantic more concerned with public virtue than academic
prestige.71 Presser quotes extensively from Carrington’s
68. Presser hints at a more sinister explanation for the neglect of Glendon’s work –
that she is a “conservative Christian woman” (p. 347), perhaps the most underrepresented
demographic in the entire legal academy. See Lindgren, supra note 55, at 148.
69. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991).
70. As mentioned above, Presser’s analysis would have benefitted from exploring in
greater depth these overlaps between critical legal theory and traditional conservatism.
71. In distinguishing Carrington from many of the other scholars profiled in the book,
Presser notes how Carrington “has never had tenure at a Northeastern or Ivy League institution,
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controversial article, Diversity!,72 to let Carrington’s striking prose
and provocative arguments speak for themselves, bubbling over
with verve in inveighing against the diversity enterprise that has
picked up significant momentum in the 25 years since the article
was published. Carrington’s iconoclastic style dovetails nicely into
the most iconoclastic and stylistic writer ever to sit on the
Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia, covered in Chapter 20.
Given the overall purpose of the book—to explore and
chronicle changes in the legal academy—Chapter 20 may be
faulted for focusing too much on Justice Scalia and too little on
Professor Scalia. This chapter would have benefitted from a
deeper exploration of what kind of professor he was, both in and
outside the classroom.73
If there is any conceptual fault in the Scalia chapter, it is the
one appearing in various parts of the book—Presser’s propensity
to hew too closely to conventional partisan narratives. For
example, Presser distinguishes Scalia from Dworkin, on the
ground that Scalia rejected “the essentially legislative role [for
courts] praised by Ronald Dworkin” (p. 388). This of course fits
with how conservatives often caricature these two great minds,
with Scalia putatively representing the hard-line Federalist 78
view of the role of judges, and Dworkin succumbing to the sirens
of judicial activism. But, whatever one’s take on Dworkin’s
political leanings, it must be conceded that he argued strenuously
that adjudication is an enterprise distinct from legislation, and he
made this point, quite compellingly, in arguing that principle, and
not policy, must animate judging. Conversely, Scalia can be
charged with failing to hew the line between judging and
legislating – given his inexplicable (and perhaps indefensible)
acceptance of non-originalist precedent only some of the time
(which is something Presser notes only in passing).74
or one on the West Coast,” (p. 367). Nevertheless, as dean of one of the most prestigious law
schools south of the Mason-Dixon line (Duke Law School), Carrington was well situated within
the legal hierarchy.
72. Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, UTAH L. REV. 1105 (1992).
73. Scalia was a law professor at the University of Virginia School of Law from 1967 to
1971, and at the University of Chicago Law School from 1977 to 1982. It would have been
interesting for Presser to explore Scalia’s professorial contributions to the primary legal
conservative organization (as the first faculty adviser to the Federalist Society) and the
conservative movement’s primary legal theory (originalism).
74. Justice Scalia never resolved this issue. Shortly after he was appointed to the
Court, he defended his derogation from originalism based on his being a “faint-hearted
originalist,” Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989),
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Moreover, after having documented all the changes in the
law over the last 225 years, Presser’s analysis might have
benefitted from considering whether Dworkin and Scalia, though
occupying radically different perspectives in our 21st century
ideological spectrum, have much more in common with each
other than they do with the real targets of Presser’s affection,
Wilson and Story. Indeed, seeing the legal academy through
Presser’s chronology illustrates how much of our modern-day
fighting—such as the disagreement between Scalia and Dworkin
featured in the classic, A Matter of Interpretation75—centers on
narrow interpretive questions arising from the countermajoritarian difficulty, particularly as that problem relates to the
Warren Court legacy. This has led several scholars to argue that
the difference between Scalia and Dworkin is not really between
originalism and non-originalism, or adjudication and legislation,
or even rules and principles. The difference is rather of a much
narrower variety—between what some have dubbed Scalia’s
“expectation originalism,” whereby the expected applications of
the constitutional drafters bind later interpretations, and
Dworkin’s “semantic originalism,” whereby the purposes driving
the creation of the text are what bind later interpretations.76
Dworkin’s semantic originalism has given rise to Jack Balkin’s
“living originalism,” which similarly uses original purposes and
principles to achieve progressive goals,77 leading some to quip
that, if originalism is this inclusive, so as to encompass a whole
range of historical modes of interpretation, we are all originalists
now.78 Depending on how one views the original purpose of
originalism, the emergence of this inclusive originalism might
signal the triumph, or death-knell, of this theory of constitutional
interpretation.
Whatever one’s take on originalism as a theory of
interpretation, however, the reader will likely get the impression
but he later repudiated this argument. See Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin
Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10.
75. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
76. On Dworkin’s semantic originalism, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Dworkin as
Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 49 (2000); Larry Alexander, Was Dworkin an
Originalist, in THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN (Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan
Sciaraffa eds., 2016).
77. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2014).
78. James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 433, 437 (2013); see also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 2349 (2015).
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from Chapters 18-20 that the arc of the legal conservative
movement was short-lived, having failed to achieve its goals, a
point concretized in the fact that the final three scholars profiled
are Patricia Williams (Chapter 21, representing critical race
studies, alluded to above), Cass Sunstein (Chapter 22, on
“libertarian paternalism”), and President Barack Obama
(Chapter 23, in many ways the apotheosis of the progressive
professor-politician, also discussed above). That this trio of
thinkers represents the foreseeable future of the legal academy is
made all the more solemn by Justice Scalia’s death in February
2016, shortly before Presser completed the book. Indeed,
although the three contemporary conservatives profiled in the
book – Carrington, Glendon, and Scalia – undeniably provided
outstanding contributions to how we think about the law, it must
be conceded that, in terms of actual outcomes, they managed to
produce very little practical change with regard to their particular
causes.
For example, Presser spends significant attention on how
provocative Carrington’s charges against affirmative action were,
but Presser elides over the fact that the criticism, as biting as it
may have been in law school faculty lounges, turned out to be
largely ineffectual in practice. Indeed, 25 years after the
publication of Diversity!, the constitutionality of affirmativeaction law is now firmly settled into the Court’s precedents, with
several Republican-appointed Justices accepting diversity as a
compelling state interest.79 Not only does it seem extraordinarily
unlikely that this controversial issue is going to go away anytime
soon, certainly not by the conclusion of the 25-year window hoped
for by Justice O’Connor in her Grutter opinion,80 but in the time
since Carrington’s publication, racial grievances have only
intensified, evidenced by the growing movement for reparations,
a movement that has accelerated and spread far beyond what
even the Crits were willing to seek openly in the 1970s.81
79. See Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003).
80. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first
approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of
public higher education. . . . We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”).
81. Ta Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/projects/reparations. Cultural, legal, and economic
reparations to African Americans is one of the primary demands of Black Lives Matter.
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Likewise, 30 years after Glendon’s searing indictment of
American family law, in Abortion and Divorce in Western Law,82
the American family is struggling more than ever, as the national
out-of-wedlock birthrate has skyrocketed to over 40 percent, with
the rate for African-American mothers approaching an incredible
75 percent.83 Moreover, abortion remains a constitutionally
protected right, due in part to a plurality of Reagan- and Bush Iappointed Justices (Kennedy, Souter, and O’Connor) affirming in
Casey the “essential holding” of Roe through the “undue burden”
standard (a result in which Justices Blackman and Stevens, two
more Republican-appointed Justices, concurred on the ground
that they preferred the stronger Roe trimester framework).84 As
much as the Republican Party may complain about abortion and
single motherhood, it must be acknowledged that it has done
incredibly little, in terms of judicial appointments and public
policy, in furthering Glendon’s arguments about the sanctity of
life and family.
Finally, it is hard to find any issue central to Justice Scalia’s
agenda that will have a lasting effect on American law in terms of
outcomes. Even originalism, which may be Scalia’s greatest
contribution, is unlikely to have much of a lasting impact, at least
in terms of conserving American traditions and culture, given that
most contemporary originalists now subscribe to “New
Originalism,” a more theoretical and open-ended form of
interpretation that has been used principally to pursue a
libertarian rather than conservative agenda.85
See Reparations, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://policy.m4bl.org/reparations. Even some
conservative commentators are starting to consider reparations, though perhaps as part of
a bargain for eliminating affirmative action. See Ross Douthat, A Different Bargain on
Race, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/opinion/sunday/adifferent-bargain-on-race.html.
82. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
83. Roger Clegg, Latest Statistics on Out of Wedlock Births, THE CORNER (Oct.
11, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/360990/latest-statistics-out-wedlockbirths-roger-clegg.
84. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
85. In fact, of the nine Justices appointed by Republican presidents since the formal
birth of originalism in Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980), only two (Scalia and Thomas) have made originalism their
principal modality of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, many scholars have
questioned whether even these two Justices should count as true originalists. See, e.g.,
SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE
THOMAS (2002) (arguing that Justice Thomas interprets the Constitution against the
libertarian background of the natural-law guarantees expressed in the Declaration of
Independence); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted”
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That is not to deny categorically Steven Calabresi’s
statement, quoted by Presser, that Scalia was “the most important
justice in American history—greater than former Chief Justice
John Marshall himself” (p. 403). In terms of style, character, and
charm, Scalia’s greatness is undeniable. And in terms of legal
wisdom and methodology, his greatness is certainly arguable,
depending of course on one’s ideological orientation and
preferred mode of legal interpretation.86 Indeed, for a
traditionalist like Presser, Scalia was the model Justice, as “the
late twentieth and early twenty-first century’s greatest judicial
traditionalist, and perhaps its greatest champion of the rule of
law” (p. 403). But in terms of persuasive efficacy, especially in
producing traditionalist outcomes, Scalia’s importance is often
overstated. Notwithstanding his abundant brilliance, he could not
manage to keep the boulder on top of the mountain, when the
entire legal culture was driving and impelling it downwards. At
least one can hope that, to borrow Camus’ analysis of Sisyphus,
Scalia was happy in pursuing his endeavor, no matter how futile it
may have been.87
CONCLUSION

The concluding chapter of Law Professors leaves the reader
with Presser’s not unexpectedly pessimistic ruminations on the
status of the American legal academy and law in general: “Lady
Justice may no longer be wearing her blindfold” (p. 460), which
for Presser constitutes a serious threat to the rule of law. The
critical reader might resist Presser’s diagnosis here, however, on
the ground that Lady Justice was never blindfolded—and perhaps
for good reason: As President Obama famously described the
arbitration of justice, it is messy and gritty, requiring an eye
Originalism, 75 CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006) (arguing that Justice Scalia is not truly an originalist,
given his “faint-hearted” derogations from original meaning).
86. For an example of one argument against Scalia’s wisdom, see Gary Peller’s
vituperative response to Dean Traynor’s press release mourning Scalia’s death on behalf
of the Georgetown Law community—in particular, Peller objected on the ground that
Scalia “was a defender of privilege, oppression and bigotry, one whose intellectual
positions were not brilliant but simplistic and formalistic.” David Lat, Controversy Erupts
at a T14 Law School Over How (Or Even Whether) To Mourn Justice Scalia,
ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 17, 2016), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/02/controversy-erupts-ata-t14-law-school-over-how-or-even-whether-to-mourn-justice-scalia/2.
87. ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS: AND OTHER ESSAYS 123 (First
Vintage International ed., 1991) (1955) (“The struggle itself toward the heights is enough
to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”).
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constantly on the scales to ensure that the law lives up to its
highest purposes.
Most readers of Law Professors likely will not conclude the
book in absolute agreement with Presser’s diagnosis that the rule
of law in America is actually on the verge of being destroyed by
law professors and their judicial accomplices. Partisanship has, to
be sure, invaded the legal academy and judiciary in a way that was
previously unheard of, and legal scholarship and judicial
craftsmanship have certainly changed over time. But overall, the
rule of law, that fuzzy contestable concept that at its core simply
requires a sovereign to follow legal texts and comply with legal
authorities,88 is not categorically different now than it was one or
even two hundred years ago. As much as we might complain that
our current president, just like his predecessor, neglects legal
commands,89 both of these supposed authoritarians90 have
followed judicial decisions and legal processes, no matter how
much they have griped about it.91
So is Presser simply a Cassandra, needlessly worrying about
a legal system that is as healthy as ever? Not at all. Something has
indeed been lost, something precious. And it is increasingly hard
to imagine that thing being recovered. In reading Law Professors,
particularly the conclusion, one may hear traces of one of Justice
Scalia’s great quotes (in dissent of course): “The Court must be
living in another world,” Scalia wrote. “Day by day, case by case,
it is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not

88. See generally BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004). On the
contestability of the rule of law, see Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially
Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002).
89. Presser discusses Obama’s many derogations from the law (pp. 443–54). For a
more extensive discussion, suggesting that Obama’s disregard for legal constraints verged
on authoritarianism, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE
OF LAW (2015); see also JOSH BLACKMAN, UNRAVELED: OBAMACARE, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, AND EXECUTIVE POWER (2016).
90. Indeed, it is quite astonishing how frequently commentators refer to both of these
presidents as authoritarian. See, e.g., David French, Despite the Hysteria, Trump Is
Trending Less Authoritarian Than Obama, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 23, 2017),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445185/trump-less-authoritarian-obama.
91. For example, after complaining of the “travel ban” decision by the “so-called judge,”
President Trump did not ignore the ruling. Instead, Trump issued a narrower executive order,
designed to comply with the decision. That second executive order was subsequently invalidated
by multiple federal courts, prompting President Trump to issue a third executive order to comply
with those rulings. That third executive order has also been invalidated by lower courts and it is
currently before the U.S. Supreme Court.

5 - MERRIAM .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

BOOK REVIEWS

2/25/18 11:59 AM

107

recognize.”92 What is unrecognizable to a traditionalist like
Presser is not so much the machinery of the rule of law or the
missing blindfold on Lady Justice, but the identity of the nation
itself.
That is what has been lost: that shared sense of meaning and
understanding, anchored in tradition and belonging. Professor
Presser’s powerful account of the legal academy demonstrates
how, over the last 225 years, that identity has been slipping away.
In 21st century America, there is certainly the rule of law, and it is
perhaps as strong and healthy ever, but it is operating in a
markedly different way, running a system where diversity, change,
and individualism are more integral to the legal order than
commonality, stability, and community.
The book thus leaves the reader with the indelible impression
that what really matters in the 21st century is not so much that
we’re all realists or all originalists. What matters is that we’re all
multicultural progressives now. For a traditionalist, this does not
necessarily mean that American law cannot survive, or even that
we cannot practice or teach law within this system. Perhaps we
can even learn to love it. But it also may be the case that we can
really only fall in love once, for no person or thing can replace, as
Kierkegaard wrote, “my heart’s sovereign mistress (‘Regina’)
stored in the deepest recesses of my heart, in my most brimmingly
vital thoughts, there where it is equally far to heaven as to hell–
unknown divinity.” 93

92. Board of Comm’rs, Waubansee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
93. See KIERKEGAARD, supra note 3, at 100.

